Araştırma Makalesi
BibTex RIS Kaynak Göster
Yıl 2020, Sayı: 50, 133 - 145, 28.07.2020

Öz

Kaynakça

  • Anderson, M. L., (2010). “Neural reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brain.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33: 245–313.
  • Arbib, M., (1987). “Modularity and interaction of brain regions underlying visuomotor coordination.” Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding içinde, editör J. L. Garfield, 333–363. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Ariew, A., (1999). “Innateness is canalization: In defense of a developmental account of innateness.” Where Biology Meets Psychology içinde editor V. G. Hardcastle, 117–138. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Bargh, J. A., ve Chartrand, T. L., (1999). “The unbearable automaticity of being.” American Psychologist 54: 462–479.
  • Barrett, H. C., (2005). “Enzymatic computation and cognitive modularity.” Mind & Language 20: 259–287.
  • Barrett, H. C., ve Kurzban, R., (2006). “Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate.” Psychological Review 113: 628–647.
  • Best, S. J., Chmielewski, B., ve Krueger, B. S., (2005). “Selective exposure to online foreign news during the conflict with Iraq.” Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 10(4): 52–70.
  • Bimber, B., ve Davis, R., (2003). Campaigning online: The internet in U.S. elections. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Boudana, S., (2011). “A definition of journalistic objectivity as a performance.” Media, Culture & Society 33(3): 385–398. DOI: 10.1177/0163443710394899.
  • Brewer, W.F., ve Loschky, L., (2005). “Top-down and bottom-up influences on observation: Evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science.” Cognitive penetrability of perception, içinde, editör A. Raftopoulos, 31–47. New York: Nova Science.
  • Brogaard, B., Marlow, K., ve Rice K., (2014). The long-term potentiation model for grapheme-color binding in synesthesia. In Sensory integration and the unity of consciousness, ed. D. Bennett and C. Hill, 37–72. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Carruthers, P., (2006). The architecture of the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Churchland, P.S., Ramachandran V., ve Sejnowski. T., (1994). “A critique of pure vision.” Large-scale neuronal theories of the brain içinde, editörler T. Sejnowski, C. Koch, ve J. Davis, 23–60. Cambridge: Bradford.
  • Churchland, P. M., (1988). Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor.” Philosophy of Science 55(2): 167-187.
  • Cosmides, L., ve Tooby, J., (1992). “Cognitive adaptations for social exchange.” The Adapted Mind içinde, editör J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, ve J. Tooby, 163–228. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Cowie, F., (1999). What’s Within? Nativism Reconsidered, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • D’Alessio, D., ve Allen, M., (2002). “Selective exposure and dissonance after decisions.” Psychological Reports, 91(2):527–532.
  • Dalton, R. J., Beck, P. A., ve Huckfeldt, R., (1998). “Partisan cues and the media: Information flows in the 1992 presidential election.” American Political Science Review, 92(1):111–126.
  • Fodor, J., (1987). Psychosemantics. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
  • Fodor, J., (1983). “Observation Reconsidered.” Philosophy of Science, 51:23-43.
  • Fodor, J., (1988). “A Reply to Churchland’s “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality”” Philosophy of Science 55(2):188-198.
  • Fodor, J., (2000a). The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, MIT Press.
  • Fodor, J., (2000b). In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosopy of Mind. MIT Press.
  • Green, D., Palmquist, B., ve Schickler, E., (2002). Partisan hearts & minds: Political parties and the social identities of voters, New Haven: Yale University Press.
  • Habermas, J., (1990). “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification.” Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action içinde, çeviren Christian Lenhardt ve Shierry Weber Nicholsen, 43–115. Cambridge, MA. Mit Press.
  • Littlejohn, S. W., & Foss, K. A., (2011). Theories of human communication. (10, Ed.) Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
  • Macpherson, F., (2012). Cognitive penetration of color experience: Rethinking the issue in light of an indirect mechanism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84:24–62.
  • Maqsood, T., Finegan, A. D., ve Walker, D. H. T., (2004). “Biases and heuristics in judgment and decision making: The dark side of tacit knowledge.” Issues in Informing Science and Information Technology, 1, 295-301.
  • Marslen-Wilson, W., ve Tyler, L. K., (1987). “Against modularity.” Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding içinde, editör J. L. Garfield, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • McCauley, R. N., ve Henrich, J., (2006). “Susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion, theory-neutral observation, and the diachronic penetrability of the visual input system.” Philosophical Psychology, 19:79–101.
  • Modular. (2020). In Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved January 20, 2020, from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/modularity.
  • Mutz, D. C., ve Martin, P. S., (2001). “Facilitating communication across lines of political difference: The role of mass media.” American Political Science Review, 95(1):97–114.
  • Mutz, D.C., (2002). “Cross-cutting social networks: Testing democratic theory in practice.” American Political Science Review, 96(1):111-125.
  • Nitcavic, R., (2013). Fundamentals of public communication. Plymouth, Michigian: Hayden- McNeil.
  • Peters, T., (1987). Thriving on Chaos: Handbook for a management revolution. New York: Harper and Row.
  • Pinker, S., (1997). How the Mind Works, New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
  • Prinz, J., (2006). “Is the mind really modular?” Contemporary debates in cognitive science, içinde, editör J. Stainton, 22– 36. Malden: Blackwell.
  • Pylyshyn, Z., (1984). Computation and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Samuels, R., (2000). “Massively modular minds: Evolutionary psychology and cognitive architecture.” Evolution and the Human Mind içinde, editör P. Carruthers and A. Chamberlain, 13–46 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Scholl, B. J., ve Leslie, A. M., (1999). “Modularity, development and ‘theory of mind’.” Mind & Language, 14:131–153.
  • Schütz, A., (1962). The Problem of Social Reality: Collected Papers I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
  • Sears, D. O., ve Freedman, J. L., (1967). “Selective exposure to information: A critical review.” Public Opinion Quarterly, 31(2):194–213.
  • Spelke, E., (1994). “Initial knowledge: Six suggestions.” Cognition, 50: 435–445.
  • Sperber, D., (1994). “The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations.” Mapping the mind: domain specificity in cognition and culture, içinde, editörler L. A. Hirschfeld ve S. A. Gelman, New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Sperber, D., ve Wilson, D., (2002). “Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading.” Mind & Language, 17: 3–23.
  • Stokes, D., (2011). “Perceiving and desiring: a new look at the cognitive penetrability of experience.” Philosophical Studies 158:477–492.
  • Stromswold, K., (1999). “Cognitive and neural aspects of language acquisition.” What Is Cognitive Science? içinde, editörler E. Lepore ve Z. Pylyshyn, 356–400Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Tunchman, G., (1972). “Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen’s Notion of Objectivity.” American Journal of Sociology, 77(4):660-679.
  • Ward, S. J. A., (2010). “Inventing objectivity : new philosophical foundations.” Journalism Ethics: A Philosophical Approach içinde, editör Christopher Meyers, Oxford University Press.
  • Wiredu, K., (1980). “A Philosophical perspective on the concept of human communication.” International social science journal, XXXII, 2:199-206.
  • Wu, W., (2013). “Visual spatial constancy and modularity: Does intention penetrate vision?” Philosophical Studies 165:647–669.

İletişimde Algılar ve Nesnellik İlişkisine Kapsülleme Teorisi ile Bakmak

Yıl 2020, Sayı: 50, 133 - 145, 28.07.2020

Öz

Gerçekliğin nesnel mi olduğu yoksa insan yorumlarından mı kaynaklandığı konusu iletişimin öneminin arttığı günümüzde iletişim felsefesinin de önemli bir konusudur. Bugün bireylerin zihinsel süreçlerinden kaynaklanan farklılıkların iletişim davranışındaki farklılıklara da sebep olduğu bilinmektedir. Bilgi edinme sürecimizin merkezinde sahip olduğumuz felsefi varsayımlar ve kabuller yatmaktadır. Felsefi anlamda esas olan nokta iletişim sürecinde gözlemlerimize dayanarak bir bilgiyi nasıl edindiğimizi ve anlamı nasıl kurduğumuzu ortaya koymaktır. Ancak algısal düzeyde, dışımızda olan dünyanın bilgisinin zihinsel süreçlerimizin varsayımlarından bağımsız olarak algılanıp algılanmadığı tartışması nesnellik tartışmalarının kalbini oluşturmaktadır.
Felsefe ve iletişim disiplinlerinde merkezi bir kavram olan nesnellik konusunda analitik felsefe ile iletişim alanının temalarını bir arada değerlendirmek nesnellik tartışmalarına farklı bir bakış açısı getirecektir. Bu çalışma ile algı düzeyinde nesnelliğin mümkün olup olmadığı sorusuna analitik felsefenin iki önemli figürü olan Fodor ve Churchland’in yürüttükleri tartışma bağlamında cevap aranmaktadır. Tartışmanın odak noktası, bilginin epistemolojik konumu ve bunun nesnellik bağlamında değerlendirilmesidir. Zihnin bilgiyi alma ve işleme süreçlerinin nasıl kavramsallaştırıldığı algısal süreçleri belirlemekte, bu da nesnellik tartışmalarında anahtar vazifesi görmektedir. Bu amaçla, çalışmada iletişim ve etkileşim süreçlerimizde algılarımızın oynadığı rollerin yanı sıra algı süreçlerimiz kapsülleme teorisinin epistemolojik sonuçları bağlamında tartışılmıştır. Ayrıca algıların güvenilirliği ve nesnellik ile ilişkisi Fodor ve Churchland’in yaklaşımları bağlamında tartışılmaktadır.
Sonuç olarak, algılar ve bilişsel süreçler arasında bir ayrım olup olmadığı ve bunun nesnelliği ne orada etkilediği tartışması halen devam etmektedir. Ancak Fodor'un kapsülleme teorisi ile en azından duyusal düzeyde bir nesnellik sağlamaya çalışması takdire şayandır. Aslında bu da nesnelliğin en azından giriş düzeyinde sağlandığını daha sonrasını garanti etmediğini ortaya koyar niteliktedir.

Kaynakça

  • Anderson, M. L., (2010). “Neural reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brain.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33: 245–313.
  • Arbib, M., (1987). “Modularity and interaction of brain regions underlying visuomotor coordination.” Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding içinde, editör J. L. Garfield, 333–363. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Ariew, A., (1999). “Innateness is canalization: In defense of a developmental account of innateness.” Where Biology Meets Psychology içinde editor V. G. Hardcastle, 117–138. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Bargh, J. A., ve Chartrand, T. L., (1999). “The unbearable automaticity of being.” American Psychologist 54: 462–479.
  • Barrett, H. C., (2005). “Enzymatic computation and cognitive modularity.” Mind & Language 20: 259–287.
  • Barrett, H. C., ve Kurzban, R., (2006). “Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate.” Psychological Review 113: 628–647.
  • Best, S. J., Chmielewski, B., ve Krueger, B. S., (2005). “Selective exposure to online foreign news during the conflict with Iraq.” Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 10(4): 52–70.
  • Bimber, B., ve Davis, R., (2003). Campaigning online: The internet in U.S. elections. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Boudana, S., (2011). “A definition of journalistic objectivity as a performance.” Media, Culture & Society 33(3): 385–398. DOI: 10.1177/0163443710394899.
  • Brewer, W.F., ve Loschky, L., (2005). “Top-down and bottom-up influences on observation: Evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science.” Cognitive penetrability of perception, içinde, editör A. Raftopoulos, 31–47. New York: Nova Science.
  • Brogaard, B., Marlow, K., ve Rice K., (2014). The long-term potentiation model for grapheme-color binding in synesthesia. In Sensory integration and the unity of consciousness, ed. D. Bennett and C. Hill, 37–72. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Carruthers, P., (2006). The architecture of the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Churchland, P.S., Ramachandran V., ve Sejnowski. T., (1994). “A critique of pure vision.” Large-scale neuronal theories of the brain içinde, editörler T. Sejnowski, C. Koch, ve J. Davis, 23–60. Cambridge: Bradford.
  • Churchland, P. M., (1988). Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor.” Philosophy of Science 55(2): 167-187.
  • Cosmides, L., ve Tooby, J., (1992). “Cognitive adaptations for social exchange.” The Adapted Mind içinde, editör J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, ve J. Tooby, 163–228. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Cowie, F., (1999). What’s Within? Nativism Reconsidered, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • D’Alessio, D., ve Allen, M., (2002). “Selective exposure and dissonance after decisions.” Psychological Reports, 91(2):527–532.
  • Dalton, R. J., Beck, P. A., ve Huckfeldt, R., (1998). “Partisan cues and the media: Information flows in the 1992 presidential election.” American Political Science Review, 92(1):111–126.
  • Fodor, J., (1987). Psychosemantics. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
  • Fodor, J., (1983). “Observation Reconsidered.” Philosophy of Science, 51:23-43.
  • Fodor, J., (1988). “A Reply to Churchland’s “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality”” Philosophy of Science 55(2):188-198.
  • Fodor, J., (2000a). The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, MIT Press.
  • Fodor, J., (2000b). In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosopy of Mind. MIT Press.
  • Green, D., Palmquist, B., ve Schickler, E., (2002). Partisan hearts & minds: Political parties and the social identities of voters, New Haven: Yale University Press.
  • Habermas, J., (1990). “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification.” Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action içinde, çeviren Christian Lenhardt ve Shierry Weber Nicholsen, 43–115. Cambridge, MA. Mit Press.
  • Littlejohn, S. W., & Foss, K. A., (2011). Theories of human communication. (10, Ed.) Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
  • Macpherson, F., (2012). Cognitive penetration of color experience: Rethinking the issue in light of an indirect mechanism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84:24–62.
  • Maqsood, T., Finegan, A. D., ve Walker, D. H. T., (2004). “Biases and heuristics in judgment and decision making: The dark side of tacit knowledge.” Issues in Informing Science and Information Technology, 1, 295-301.
  • Marslen-Wilson, W., ve Tyler, L. K., (1987). “Against modularity.” Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding içinde, editör J. L. Garfield, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • McCauley, R. N., ve Henrich, J., (2006). “Susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion, theory-neutral observation, and the diachronic penetrability of the visual input system.” Philosophical Psychology, 19:79–101.
  • Modular. (2020). In Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved January 20, 2020, from https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/modularity.
  • Mutz, D. C., ve Martin, P. S., (2001). “Facilitating communication across lines of political difference: The role of mass media.” American Political Science Review, 95(1):97–114.
  • Mutz, D.C., (2002). “Cross-cutting social networks: Testing democratic theory in practice.” American Political Science Review, 96(1):111-125.
  • Nitcavic, R., (2013). Fundamentals of public communication. Plymouth, Michigian: Hayden- McNeil.
  • Peters, T., (1987). Thriving on Chaos: Handbook for a management revolution. New York: Harper and Row.
  • Pinker, S., (1997). How the Mind Works, New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
  • Prinz, J., (2006). “Is the mind really modular?” Contemporary debates in cognitive science, içinde, editör J. Stainton, 22– 36. Malden: Blackwell.
  • Pylyshyn, Z., (1984). Computation and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Samuels, R., (2000). “Massively modular minds: Evolutionary psychology and cognitive architecture.” Evolution and the Human Mind içinde, editör P. Carruthers and A. Chamberlain, 13–46 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Scholl, B. J., ve Leslie, A. M., (1999). “Modularity, development and ‘theory of mind’.” Mind & Language, 14:131–153.
  • Schütz, A., (1962). The Problem of Social Reality: Collected Papers I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
  • Sears, D. O., ve Freedman, J. L., (1967). “Selective exposure to information: A critical review.” Public Opinion Quarterly, 31(2):194–213.
  • Spelke, E., (1994). “Initial knowledge: Six suggestions.” Cognition, 50: 435–445.
  • Sperber, D., (1994). “The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations.” Mapping the mind: domain specificity in cognition and culture, içinde, editörler L. A. Hirschfeld ve S. A. Gelman, New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Sperber, D., ve Wilson, D., (2002). “Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading.” Mind & Language, 17: 3–23.
  • Stokes, D., (2011). “Perceiving and desiring: a new look at the cognitive penetrability of experience.” Philosophical Studies 158:477–492.
  • Stromswold, K., (1999). “Cognitive and neural aspects of language acquisition.” What Is Cognitive Science? içinde, editörler E. Lepore ve Z. Pylyshyn, 356–400Oxford: Blackwell.
  • Tunchman, G., (1972). “Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen’s Notion of Objectivity.” American Journal of Sociology, 77(4):660-679.
  • Ward, S. J. A., (2010). “Inventing objectivity : new philosophical foundations.” Journalism Ethics: A Philosophical Approach içinde, editör Christopher Meyers, Oxford University Press.
  • Wiredu, K., (1980). “A Philosophical perspective on the concept of human communication.” International social science journal, XXXII, 2:199-206.
  • Wu, W., (2013). “Visual spatial constancy and modularity: Does intention penetrate vision?” Philosophical Studies 165:647–669.
Toplam 51 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil Türkçe
Konular İletişim ve Medya Çalışmaları
Bölüm Araştırma Makaleleri
Yazarlar

Nevfel Boz 0000-0001-6109-1610

Yayımlanma Tarihi 28 Temmuz 2020
Gönderilme Tarihi 17 Mayıs 2020
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2020 Sayı: 50

Kaynak Göster

APA Boz, N. (2020). İletişimde Algılar ve Nesnellik İlişkisine Kapsülleme Teorisi ile Bakmak. İletişim Kuram Ve Araştırma Dergisi, 2020(50), 133-145.